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LOCAL PUBLIC PROCUREMENT: HOW TO DEAL WITH A 
CREATIVE BIDDER?
A CASE STUDY FROM THE NETHERLANDS
M. Peter van der Hoek
ABSTRACT.  This paper presents an analysis of the procurement of 
transportation services for the disabled by the town of Ridderkerk. The method 
used consisted of a study of the town’s files and interviews with 11 persons 
involved. The tender specifications were peculiar in that they required bidders to 
submit a schedule with prices per ride for seven classes ranging from 100,000 to 
over 600,000, whereas the real number of rides amounted to 270,000. One of the 
bidders quoted high prices for the first classes and very low prices for the last 
classes. On the basis of all seven classes, he quoted the lowest costs and won the 
contract. However, on the basis of the real number of rides he was the second 
most expensive bidder. 
INTRODUCTION
This paper presents an analysis of a particular public procurement 
case pertaining to the town of Ridderkerk, a Dutch town neighboring 
Rotterdam. The town’s budget for a population of nearly 50,000
amounted to €116 million ($173 million) in 2008. Dutch municipalities 
are mandated to extend facilities for their disabled citizens to enable their 
independent participation in society as related to their living situation, 
transport and wheelchairs. Thus, disabled persons can apply for certain 
facilities. As the mandate is open-ended, each application meeting the 
criteria must be approved. A lack of financial means cannot be a reason 
to reject any application. However, the city council had some latitude 
with regard to the following:
- the situations and the form in which facilities can be awarded; and
- the amount of financial compensations.
Public procurement is subject to a number of rules established on 
different legislative levels. First, the European Union issued a series of 
procurement directives prohibiting discriminatory purchasing practices 
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(Martin, Hartley & Cox, 1999). The European Court of Justice (EJC) 
developed a set of basic standards for the award of public contracts, 
which were derived directly from the rules and principles of the Rome 
Treaty. “The principles of equal treatment and nondiscrimination on 
grounds of nationality imply an obligation of transparency which, 
according to the ECJ case-law, consists in ensuring, for the benefit of any 
potential tenderer, a degree of advertising sufficient to enable the 
services market to be opened up to competition and the impartiality of 
the procedures to be reviewed” (European Commission, 2006, p. C 
179/3). 
Initially, governments could easily evade the rules, but later on 
procurement directives were issued that were considerably more 
effective. In addition, the new directives also covered services. However, 
the directives contained a threshold before Value Added Tax (VAT) 
below which the rules did not apply. In the case of Ridderkerk analyzed 
in this paper, the threshold amounted to nearly €250,000 ($370,000). 
Second, national law was relevant for public procurement. European 
directives obliged the member states to achieve a certain result, but left 
them free to choose how to do so. Thus, a directive is a two-tier 
legislative instrument comprising:
- the directive proper, issued by the European Union, and
- national implementing measures, issued by the member states.
If a directive comes into force, it does not in principle imply direct effect 
in national law. Rather, member states must transpose a directive into 
national law, which means adopting national measures to enable them to 
achieve the results stipulated by the directive. 
Third, local governments may issue by-laws. The council of Ridder-
kerk, for example, issued a local act that laid down a number of 
principles for the town’s procurement policy, the most important being 
compliance with national and international regulations and cooperation 
with other local governments where possible.
The contract that Ridderkerk had concluded with a taxi company to 
deliver transportation services for the disabled expired on September 1, 
2003. Therefore, the new contract had to be concluded by this date. This 
paper analyzes the procurement process. The main conclusion is that 
Ridderkerk had incurred avoidable costs amounting to €643,500 
($957,000) over a 3-year period. After a brief overview of the literature 
and methodology, this paper will describe Ridderkerk’s preparation of 
the tender, analyze the bidding process, and explain the consequences.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY
The English language literature on local government procurement is 
very scarce. To my knowledge, the Journal of Public Procurement is 
the only scholarly journal covering the subject.2 Other journals may also 
feature articles on local government procurement, but this is fairly rare. 
An example is Duncombe and Searcy (2007, p. 68) who observed that 
“… very little is known about what local governments do in practice, and 
how procurement practices affect government spending.” They report the 
results of a survey on procurement practices used by New York State 
school districts, and conclude that the use of competitive bidding, 
purchasing calendars, central warehouses, and bidders’ lists was 
associated with significant cost savings.
There is some literature on competitive procurement in specific 
countries. Vincent-Jones (1999) addressed the regulatory transition from 
compulsory competitive tendering to the Best Value framework in the 
UK. While considering the compulsory competitive tendering a 
regulatory failure, he foresaw a brighter future for the Best Value 
framework. Martin, Hartley and Cox (1999) examined the impact of 
European Union procurement directives on local authority tendering and 
contract award behavior and presented the findings from a case study of 
a British local authority (Leeds City Council). They concluded that, in 
the case of Leeds, there was a tendency to award contracts to domestic 
firms, which is consistent with an analysis of local authority contract 
award data for 1993 revealing that over 98% of all awards were made to 
domestic firms.
Lundberg (2005) surveyed all Swedish municipalities about their 
procurement of cleaning services. Depending on the volume of the 
procurement, the contracting entity could be selective and limit the 
number of bidders. To find an argument to support this, an 
implementation cost was added to the expected payment to the winner. 
The empirical results did not support the assumption that an 
implementation cost actually affects the choice of procurement 
procedure. Alexandersson and Hultén (2006) analyzed the tender for 
train services to northern Sweden. They concluded that the winner’s bid 
seemed to have been predatory by intention. It was based on unrealistic 
assumptions, price dumping and/or cross-subsidization, while there was a 
risk that the company would ask for more compensation if the 
calculation prerequisites were not met. Indeed, the company was able to 
make the state increase the amount of taxpayers’ money spent on its 
services. In another article (Alexandersson & Hultén, 2007) the authors 
observed that a lack of transparency pulled public procurement of 
railway services even further away from being normal markets, 
ultimately increasing the firms’ perceived gains from strategic bidding. 
Strategic bids disturbed the functioning of the market by making it more 
unpredictable, which ultimately could deter more rational companies 
from entering and keeping competition healthy and sustainable.
Mardas and Triantafyllou (2001, p. 110) stressed that “public 
procurement law is an economic law par excellence and should not be 
content with legalistic grammatical, historical, teleological, or 
topological interpretation. Its interpretation should not contradict the 
economic analysis, if it is not to be governed by the latter.” They 
presented an arithmetic approach that could help limit the extent of a 
contractor's capacity through qualitative criteria. Additional indicators 
related to public procurement as well as to industrial and trade 
performance on the product level could also help one see the extent of 
protection derived from public procurement policy within European 
Union member states. The two series of indicators would introduce a 
primary source of information about the extent of “buy national” policies 
at the product level, which could guide the European Union’s 
competition policy.
Recently, doubts have been expressed in the Netherlands about the 
desirability of compulsory competitive tendering in that its scope may be 
too large. Obermann and Kostal (2003) signaled some fundamental 
problems of competitive tendering. They concluded that an obligation 
binding local authorities to put general economic interest services up for 
competitive tender, as intended by the European Commission, would 
have considerable medium- and long-term effects on both the process of 
municipal service provision and the economic position of municipal 
(public) enterprises. They argued that from an economic point of view, 
procurement through competitive tendering did not appear to be effective 
or tenable for all general economic interest services in (all) different 
areas. Therefore, they concluded that compulsory competitive tendering 
for service concessions should not be introduced in all areas of public 
services.
My literature search did not yield any publication about local 
government procurement of transportation services for the disabled. 
Although the literature did pay attention to predatory bidding, I did not 
find any publication dealing with bidders’ using the tender conditions in 
a creative way such that they seemed to quote the lowest costs, but in 
reality were more expensive than other bidders. This paper analyses just 
such a case. The method used was studying the files of the town of 
Ridderkerk and interviewing 11 persons involved. Seven of those 
interviewed worked for the town (five civil servants, an alderman and a 
councilor), one served as a consultant for a private consultancy named 
D&O, one was the director of the previous transport company, one was 
the director of the newly contracted transport company and one was the 
chair of the local advisory board of the disabled.
PREPARING THE TENDER
Local authorities could collaborate and pursue joint tendering 
procedures. Indeed, one of the principles of Ridderkerk’s procurement 
policy was to seek cooperation with other local governments in the 
region. Therefore, Ridderkerk collaborated with the town of Barendrecht 
to tender transportation services for the disabled. The obvious advantage 
of collaboration is that cooperating local governments will purchase 
larger volumes, which increases the likelihood of securing relatively low 
prices. 
The towns sought advisory services from D&O to guide them 
through the bidding process because they had insufficient in-house 
technical expertise. Representatives of both towns met with a 
representative of D&O on March 28, 2003. They made engagements and 
reached conclusions that are laid down in the consultant’s proposal of 
April 11, 2003, which also named the advantages of joint tendering:
- a clear regional system;
- economies of scale that may result in lower transportation costs; and
- shared costs of guidance through the bidding process.
Ensuring that the two towns’ activities are geared to one another is 
considered a requirement for a smooth working of the tendering process. 
Hence, the proposal to extend the existing contracts with the current 
transportation companies until April 1, 2004, which should provide both 
towns sufficient time to prepare the tender and to respect the terms in 
force.
D&O quoted for drafting the tender documents and administering the 
whole tender procedure from publication to judging the bids. They 
claimed to have a quality control system that would guarantee their 
product’s quality including the following:
- keeping in touch with the customer and third parties;
- registering all correspondence and contracts;
- keeping a timetable and budgetary control; and
- managing coordination and audit of internal activities.
The quotation amounted to a total of €7,950 ($11,900) before VAT.
The procurement department of Ridderkerk criticized the quotation 
heavily. It considered the number of planned consultative meetings very 
low relative to previous procurements and the price too high. Moreover, 
the department wondered whether D&O had responded to Ridderkerk’s 
quote request and why Ridderkerk had not solicited any other quotations. 
Although these comments did not lead to an adjustment of the offer’s 
content, they did lead to a €1,375 ($2,045) reduction of the price to 
€6,575 ($9,780). Additional costs (more activities and travel costs) raised 
the total eventually to €7,570 ($11,260). D&O communicated that the 
planned starting date of September 1, 2003 was no longer feasible and 
indicated that Ridderkerk would have to negotiate with the current 
transport company an extension of the contract until April 1, 2004. When 
the alderman commissioned the contract to D&O he also requested the 
addition of some details regarding a specific issue.
The specifications of the tender were finished on October 9, 2003 
and comprised five parts:
1.A general description including requirements bids and bidders must 
meet and the deadline.
2.Selection criteria for bidders.
3.Specifications.
4.A description of the award criterion price consisting of a schedule 
with seven classes. The first six classes comprised 100,000 rides 
each, whereas the seventh class was open-ended (>600,000). Bidders 
needed to quote a price per ride for each class.
5.A description of the award criterion quality.
I have observed that the minutes of the meeting representatives of 
both towns had with a representative of D&O on March 28, 2003 are 
lacking in the town’s files. As a result, it is impossible to determine 
whether the quotation was consistent with Ridderkerk’s quote request. 
What can be concluded, however, is that the procurement department’s 
comments3 had little effect. Moreover, it can be concluded that one of the 
advantages the collaboration with Barendrecht should have had – sharing 
the costs of guidance through the bidding process – had been realized. 
However, the documents do not permit determination of whether the 
other two advantages that had been named had been realized, so this 
remains unclear.
THE BIDDING PROCESS
When the deadline expired on November 27, 2003, five bids had 
been received. One of them appears to contain an unusual price structure. 
Table 1 displays the price structures of the five bids and Table 2 the total 
annual costs depending on the number of rides.4 Table 1 shows how 
unusual bidder A’s price structure was. The price per ride in the first 
class was high relative to the other bidders, while the price in the second 
class was the second highest of the five bidders. However, A’s price in 
the other classes was lower than in any other bid. In particular the price 
per ride in the highest two classes (500,001-60,000 and >600,000) was 
very low. 
D&O’s method awarded a score to each specific price per ride. It 
awarded the highest score to the lowest price, whereas it awarded another 
score to each other price on the basis of the formula (Pl/Px) times the 
maximum score, where Pl was the lowest price and Px any other price. 
For example, bidder C offered the lowest price of €2.74 in the first class 
(≤100,000 rides). Thus, it received the maximum score of 150. As bidder 
A’s price in the first class amounted to €5.22 ($7.76), A received a score 
of (2.72/5.22)*100 = 78.7 in the first class. A’s price in the third class 
(200.001-200,000) was the lowest, so A received the maximum score 
(150). In the highest three classes (300,001-400,000, 400,001-500,000 
and >600,000) A also offered the lowest price (€1.39 or $2.07) and 
received again the maximum score (50). Bidder B offered a price of 
€3.58 ($5.32) in the highest class (>600,000) and received a score of 
(1.39/3.58)*50 = 19.4.
TABLE 1
Price Schedules of Five Bidders
Bidder A Bidder B Bidder C Bidder D Bidder E
Number 
of rides 
per year
Maxim
um 
score Price Score Price Score Price Score Price Score Price Score
≤100,000 150 5.22 78.7 4.43 92.8 2.74 150.0 3.24 126.9 3.55 115.8
100,001-
200,000 150 4.03 109.4 4.25 103.8 2.94 150.0 3.21 137.4 3.52 125.3
200,001-
300,000 150 2.11 150.0 4.06 78.0 2.87 110.3 3.18 99.5 3.48 90.9
300,001-
400,000 100 1.67 100.0 3.87 43.2 2.83 59.0 3.14 53.2 3.45 48.4
400.001-
500.000 50 1.51 50.0 3.77 20.0 2.75 27.5 3.10 24.4 3.42 22.1
500,001-
600,000 50 1.39 50.0 3.68 18.9 2.59 26.8 3.04 22.9 3.39 20.5
>600,000 50 1.39 50.0 3.58 19.4 2.49 27.9 2.98 23.3 3.36 20.7
Total 588.1 376.1 551.5 487.6 115.8
Table  2. Annual Costs 
Number of 
rides per 
year Annual costs at x rides
Bidder A Bidder B Bidder C Bidder D Bidder E
100,000 522,000 443,000 274,000 324,000 355,000
200,000 925,000 868,000 568,000 645,000 707,000
300,000 1,136,000 1,274,000 855,000 963,000 1,055,000
400,000 1,303,000 1,661,000 1,138,000 1,277,000 1,400,000
500,000 1,454,000 2,038,000 1,413,000 1,587,000 1,742,000
600,000 1,593,000 2,406,000 1,672,000 1,891,000 2,081,000
270,000 1,072,700 1,152,200 768,900 867,600 950,600
Table 2 shows that bidder A offered the lowest total cost on the basis 
of 600,000 rides per year. However, the number of rides at the time of 
the tender amounted to 270,000 per year. The town of Ridderkerk 
expected this number to rise, but I did not find any quantification of this 
expectation in the town’s files. It seems extremely unlikely that the 
number of rides would more than double to over 600,000 per year. Even 
if the number of rides would grow by 10% the new total would not 
exceed 300,000 rides per year. I did not find any justification for this 
schedule. Thus, it is unclear why bids had to be based on more than 
600,000 rides per year.5
Obviously, bidder A was the only one understanding the chances 
D&O’s tender specifications offered. By including a high price in the 
first two classes of his bid, A reduced his score on the price criterion. 
However, by offering very low prices in the other classes he made this 
up. As a result, bidder A received the highest total score on the price 
criterion. A would undoubtedly have considered that the very low prices 
in the higher classes were irrelevant as the number of rides would not 
exceed 300,000 per year. In Table 2 I have also included the total costs if 
the annual number of rides would total the same number as at the time of 
the tender (270,000). In this case A was not the bidder with the lowest 
costs, but rather the second most expensive bidder.
Ridderkerk conferred with D&O about the schedule and proposed 
another scoring method. However, the tender specifications had been 
published and could not be legally changed during the bidding process. 
Thus, bidder A appeared to be the lowest bidder given the published 
specifications. Although it was not possible to change the specifications, 
Ridderkerk could have stopped the tendering procedure and started the 
whole procedure over again on the basis of new specifications. However, 
this is not what the town decided to do. It did not choose to stop, but 
rather continued the procedure. 
On March 2, 2004, the town of Ridderkerk took the preliminary 
decision to contract the transportation services for the disabled out to 
bidder A, which is Taxi Bakker. Subsequently, one of the other bidders 
asked questions about this decision, including a question about possible 
unusual price quotations. Ridderkerk responded by saying that the 
question was irrelevant and the bidder did not formally object to the 
preliminary decision. As there were no other reactions, the decision to 
contract out to Taxi Bakker became final on March 24, 2004.
CONSEQUENCES
Ridderkerk’s contract with Reyertax, the current transport company, 
would originally expire on August 31, 2003, but had been extended until 
April 1, 2004, the date by which the bidding process should have been 
finished and the newly contracted transport company should have taken 
over. However, the delay in finalizing the contract with Taxi Bakker 
forced Ridderkerk to move the starting date to October 1, 2004. 
Therefore, the contract with Reyertax was again extended, until October 
1, 2004 and at a 5% reduced cost level. As a result, the towns of 
Barendrecht and Ridderkerk had different starting dates and, thus, also 
different ending dates: April 1, 2007 for Barendrecht and October 1, 
2007 for Ridderkerk. 
Ridderkerk’s delay affected the costs of Barendrecht because it 
would enter the classes with lower prices per ride at later dates. 
Therefore, Barendrecht submitted a claim to Ridderkerk as compensation 
for the higher costs resulting from Ridderkerk’s delayed starting date.6
Barendrecht demanded an advance of €76,744 ($114,500) for the period 
June-September 2004, but agreed after mutual consultations to a reduced 
amount of €36.254 ($54,100). Further consultations led to the agreement 
that Barendrecht would have a second look at its claim and Ridderkerk 
would make its own calculation.
In February 2005, Ridderkerk communicated that there was no cost 
disadvantage for Barendrecht if Taxi Bakker invoiced the two towns 
correctly. Therefore, Ridderkerk requested Barendrecht to withdraw its 
claim. Although Barendrecht did not respond, Ridderkerk’s third 
program monitor 2006 - adopted on November 2, 2006 - showed that it 
paid €24,700 ($36,900) to Barendrecht in March 2006. Ridderkerk’s files 
are not complete and do not contain documents that clarify which 
agreements the two towns had reached and how this problem eventually 
was solved. Given that Ridderkerk never promised any compensation it 
is not clear why it honored Barendrecht’s claim anyway.
It seems obvious that Ridderkerk had made avoidable costs. I define 
avoidable costs as the total costs minus the costs that would not have 
been incurred if the contract had been awarded to the lowest bidder, but 
was also timely so that the services could have started on time and no 
extensions of the contract with the current transport company had been 
necessary. There are two reasons underlying the avoidable costs:7
1.The contract was not awarded to the lowest bidder. The total costs 
for the two towns would have been €303,800 ($453,300) per year 
lower at 270,000 rides per year. Given Ridderkerk’s share amounting 
to €167,100 ($249,300). the avoidable costs for Ridderkerk due to 
not selecting the lowest bidder total €501.300 ($747,900) over the 3-
year-period: October 1, 2004-October 1, 2007.
2.Ridderkerk had to extend the contract with Reyertax (the previous 
transport company) due to the fact that Taxi Bakker was unable to 
start on time. The costs of extending the contract with Reyertax 
exceeded the costs of the lowest bidder by €117,500 ($175,300). In 
addition, the late start of Taxi Bakker had led to Barendrecht’s claim 
of €24,700 ($36,900) on Ridderkerk. Thus, the total avoidable costs 
due to the late start of Taxi Bakker amounted to €142,200 
($212,200). 
It is now clear that the overall total avoidable costs for Ridderkerk 
amounted to €643,500 ($960,200) over the whole period, which was over 
36% of the amount Ridderkerk was tendering. The council of Ridderkerk 
accepted this without drawing any political conclusion regarding the 
alderman responsible for the tender. Therefore, there seemed to be no 
pressure on the town’s mayor and aldermen to draw lessons from this 
failure.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Dutch municipalities are mandated to extend facilities for their 
disabled citizens to enable them to participate independently in society. 
Therefore, they need to tender transportation services for the disabled. 
This paper presents an analysis of the procurement of these services by 
the town of Ridderkerk. A problem that I frequently encountered is that 
the town’s files are far from complete, not only because documents are 
simply lacking, but also because minutes of meetings were sometimes 
not made in the first place. As a result, it is not always possible to 
ascertain what was agreed and arranged. For example, due to missing 
documents, the files do not afford determination whether D&O’s 
quotation was consistent with Ridderkerk’s quote request.
Ridderkerk collaborated with the town of Barendrecht to tender 
transportation services for the disabled. Because they had insufficient in-
house technical expertise, their procurers sought advisory services from a 
private consultancy (D&O) to guide them through the bidding process. 
The procurement department criticized D&O’s quotation heavily, which 
led to a reduction of the price by €1,375 ($2,051) to €6,575 ($9,810), but 
not to an adjustment of the offer’s content. The tender specifications 
D&O drafted were peculiar in that they required bidders to submit a 
schedule with prices per ride for seven classes ranging from ≤100,000 to 
>600,000, whereas the real number of rides amounted to 270,000 at the 
time of the tender. Even if the number of rides would have grown by 
10%, the new total would not have exceeded 300,000 rides.
One of the five bidders (Taxi Bakker) understood the chances this 
schedule offered. By quoting high prices in the first classes and very low 
prices in the last classes he obtained a high score on the award criterion 
price. In practice, only the high prices in the first three classes would be 
relevant as the number of rides per year did not exceed 300,000. On the 
basis of all seven classes (up to >600,000 rides per year) Taxi Bakker 
was the lowest bidder. Therefore, the contract was awarded to Taxi 
Bakker. However, on the basis of the real number of rides (270,000 per 
year) he was the second most expensive bidder.
Ridderkerk could have discontinued the tender before preliminarily 
awarding the contract to Taxi Bakker. Next, the town could have started 
a new bidding procedure on the basis of another schedule with four 
classes ranging from ≤100,000 up to >300,000 rides per year. It goes 
without saying that starting a new tender would have required another 
extension of the current contract, which would have caused additional 
costs. However, these costs would have been considerably lower than the 
avoidable costs Ridderkerk incurred. The town’s crucial mistake was that 
it did not terminate the tender before it had already preliminarily 
awarded the contract to Taxi Bakker. The advice the town sought from a 
law office about discontinuing the procedure after the contract’s 
preliminary award was redundant as the town should have known this 
would be illegal. 
Obviously, Ridderkerk incurred avoidable costs. These costs totaled
€643,500 ($960,200) over the whole period or over 36% of the amount 
Ridderkerk was tendering. Strikingly, the council of Ridderkerk accepted 
this outcome without drawing any political conclusion regarding the 
alderman responsible for the tender.
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NOTES
1. European Court of Justice Cases C-324/98, Telaustria, [2000] ECR I-
10745, paragraph 62, C-231/03, Coname, judgment of 21.7.2005, 
paragraphs 16 to 19 and C-458/03, Parking Brixen, judgment of 
13.10.2005, paragraph 49.
2. Government Procurement also covers the subject, but this is a (non-
scholarly) magazine that aims at providing practical content for 
procurement professionals.
3. The main comments pertain to the price (too high) and the number of 
consultation moments (too low).
4. The total pertained to the costs for the towns of Barendrecht and 
Ridderkerk together. Ridderkerk’s share in the total amounted to 
55%.
5. The fact that D&O changed its method later on suggests that they 
learned from this experience and considered the method used in the 
Ridderkerk case inappropriate with the benefit of hindsight.
6. File 1.844.32 WVG folder compensation request by the town of 
Barendrecht.
7. The calculation below does not include a relatively low amount of 
€850 ($1,265) Ridderkerk paid for unnecessary legal advice about 
the bidding procedure.
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